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Abstract
The paper presents a comparative analysis of the resource-rich transition economies of Mongolia and the southern 
republics of the former Soviet Union. For Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the ability to earn revenue from cotton exports 
allowed them to avoid reform. Oil in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan was associated with large-scale corruption, but with 
soaring revenues in the 2000s their institutions evolved and to some extent improved. Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia illustrate 
the challenges facing small economies with large potential mineral resources, with the former suffering from competition 
for rents among the elite and the latter from lost opportunities. Overall the countries illustrate that a resource curse 
is not inevitable among transition economies, but a series of hurdles need to be surmounted to benefit from resource 
abundance. Neither the similar initial institutions nor those created in the 1990s are immutable. 
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INTRODUCTION
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the termination of the centrally planned economy, the 
resource wealth of the southern Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and Mongolia was seen as a major advantage for their national economic 
development. However, all seven countries experienced severe transitional recessions during the 1990s, 
and even though economic performance improved in the first decade of the 21st century it has been 
uneven and there are doubts about sustainability. This paper examines the links between resource 
management and economic performance during the transition from central planning (effectively 
1990–2010).
There is a large literature on the relatively poor performance of resource-rich countries. The recent 
literature views a resource curse as a conditional relationship, into which some resource-rich countries 
fall but other resource-rich countries do not, and has focused on two sets of conditioning variables: 
poor government spending associated with the volatility of state revenues, and institutional dysfunction, 
especially when there is competition for control over resource rents.1 A central question in this paper is 
whether countries in transition from a centrally planned economy and Communist polity are particularly 
vulnerable to a resource curse due to their fragile and changing institutions and their inexperience with 
policymaking in a market-based economy.2
The seven countries provide a rich mine of information because policies have varied across countries 
over the two decades. To simplify the structure of the paper, the individual countries’ experiences are 
presented in appendix A, while the main text of the paper presents the central arguments and cross-
country evidence. Summary statistics for the seven countries and annual data on foreign direct investment 
inflows and GDP growth are presented in tables 1 to 3. Production data for oil and gas are in table 4, and 
world prices for cotton, oil, copper, and gold are shown in figures 1 to 4.
Comparative analysis is complicated by the differing resource bases and evolution of world prices for 
different primary products. Oil is the principal export of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and was the source 
1. The theme is old, but the modern resource curse literature was stimulated by Sachs and Warner (1995). In the 1980s 
and 1990s the focus was on Dutch disease effects, but more recent contributions emphasize volatility or institutions. 
Volatility issues are emphasized in Gelb et al. (1988), Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth (2002), Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), and 
van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010). Tornell and Lane (1999) modeled the perverse impact of rent-seeking after a resource 
windfall. Tsalik (2003), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), and Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005) highlighted 
the deleterious impact of poor institutional quality. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) found that resource abundance 
is a boon with good (producer-friendly) institutions and a curse with bad rent-grabber-friendly) institutions, while 
Boschini, Petersson, and Roine (2007) emphasized the interaction between the appropriability of resources and quality of 
institutions.
2. Esanov, Raiser, and Buiter (2001) argued that resource abundance was particularly harmful in the Soviet successor 
states because it allowed reform to be postponed and encouraged rent-seeking behavior, but that paper was written before 
the booms of the 2000s. Brunnschweiler (2009) reached the opposite conclusion that among former Soviet and Eastern 
European countries in transition, oil had a positive impact on growth between 1990 and 2006.3
of their rapid growth in 2000–08. Natural gas is more important for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (and 
is also important for Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) and raises issues of pipelines and long-term contracts.3 
Minerals are important across the region, but especially copper for Mongolia and gold for the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Uzbekistan. In Central Asia conflict between upstream and downstream countries over 
water use has energy aspects, especially the development of hydroelectric capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic 
and Tajikistan. Water is also a critical input for cotton production, which is a significant export for 
all Central Asian countries, especially Uzbekistan. Although this paper focuses on energy and mineral 
resources rather than agricultural production, it is difficult to ignore cotton. 
An important economic policy variation is between more dirigiste regimes (e.g., Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan) and more liberal regimes (e.g., the Kyrgyz Republic and Mongolia). This may 
be endogenous, as the dominant role of cotton in the Uzbek and Turkmen economies at the time of 
independence contributed to a policy focus on rent appropriation. Cotton required extensive government 
presence in maintaining irrigation channels and other functions, and this presence spilled over into the 
maintenance of state marketing monopolies and subsequent squeezing of farmers’ margins. Moreover, 
with buoyant cotton prices in the early and mid-1990s (figure 1), the cotton-exporting countries were 
able to maintain public expenditure relatively well and were under less pressure to reform their economic 
and political systems than other countries in transition from central planning.
The economies reliant on energy and mineral resources were under pressure to find foreign investors 
to help exploit the resources and to be more market-friendly in their policies. In the 2000s oil-exporting 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan reaped the fruits of contracts signed in the 1990s and had to decide how to 
manage the resource boom. Kazakhstan also appeared to reconsider the terms under which it had allowed 
foreign investors into its energy sector, raising doubts about the security of long-term contracts and of 
institutional arrangements. The smaller economies of the Kyrgyz Republic and Mongolia had greater 
difficulty striking a balance in negotiations with large foreign companies to explore and exploit their 
mineral (i.e., gold and copper) reserves.
The extensive literature on whether resource abundance is a curse indicates that many resource-rich 
countries have had poor economic performance, but many others have not. This paper assumes the 
existence of a potential bounty from resource abundance, but to realize the bounty a country must 
surmount several hurdles, and each has potential pitfalls:
n  The resources need to be found and exploited. For many mineral and energy resources this requires 
specialized skills, not possessed by domestic companies. Forgoing significant external participation 
3. The seven countries are land-locked and transport infrastructure is important, but it is also commodity specific. For 
both oil and gas, pipelines are the least-cost mode of transport, but for oil, rail (and boat across the Caspian) is a plausible 
alternative. For gas, pipelines dominate, and construction of a pipeline is associated with long-term supply contracts to 
restrict opportunistic behavior by the monopoly supplier or the monopsony customer.4
can constrain output and lead to missed opportunities (as in Turkmenistan and Mongolia), but 
attracting competing foreign investors may create institutional problems, such as opportunities for 
corruption.
n  When the resources are sold, revenues need to be divided. Resource rents typically accrue to the state, 
but individuals may try to capture rents. Excessive competition for rents can lead to a tragedy of the 
anticommons (i.e., too little output) or to state capture by a narrow elite. In both cases institutional 
degradation is the result. Recontracting to decrease the share of rents accruing to foreign partners will 
reduce a country’s attractiveness to future foreign investors.
n  Once rents have accrued to the state, a sovereign wealth fund may help macropolicy (minimizing 
Dutch disease effects) or smooth the earnings flow or save for future generations, but politicians may 
be tempted to raid the fund. Having an easy source of public revenue may be associated with poor 
public policy and lack of accountability, as the government does not need to seek public approval 
(e.g., via parliament) for its spending policies. Both the size and composition of current public 
spending may be inappropriate for long-run economic development.
These challenges will be addressed under three headings: producing resource exports, competing for 
rents, and using resource revenues.
PRODUCINg ResOURCe exPORTs
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Tarr (1994) estimated which Soviet successor states would 
benefit most from being able to trade at world prices rather than Soviet prices. The big gainers were 
energy exporters, including Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia. In fact, energy resources 
proved less valuable than expected during the transition from central planning, because world energy 
prices were stagnant between 1992 and 1998 and because oil and gas exports had to use the Russian 
pipeline network, whose operator charged high transit fees. Turkmenistan’s gas was sold to customers 
on the network under long-run contracts; Ukraine and Azerbaijan did not pay their gas bills, causing 
Turkmenistan eventually to cut off gas supplies in 1997–99 and suffer loss of GDP.
The big gainers from the shift to world prices after 1992 were cotton exporters. Cotton has a 
high value/weight ratio and is relatively easy to export by a variety of modes. In addition world prices 
rose between 1992 and 1996 (figure 1), benefitting especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; cotton 
production in the third-largest producer, Tajikistan, was disrupted by civil war until 1997. Uzbekistan 
was the best performing former Soviet republic in the 1990s, but there were pitfalls. Cotton revenues 
cushioned the transitional recession but also reduced the perceived need for radical reform; Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan remain, with Belarus, the least reformed formerly centrally planned economies. The 5
downturn in world cotton prices in 1996 triggered draconian foreign exchange controls in Uzbekistan, 
and Turkmenistan followed in 1998. Maintaining controls led to further measures fostering state control 
and stifling economic activity. Even after Uzbekistan lifted controls de jure in 2003 and made the national 
currency convertible, de facto convertibility was restricted by bureaucratic obstacles.
Outcomes in the Uzbek and Turkmen cotton sectors were similar but not identical. Both 
governments used state marketing to extract rents from cotton and leave farmers’ revenues far below 
world prices, and both provided incentives to shift from cotton to wheat in the name of food security. In 
Uzbekistan, however, the state played a positive function in maintaining irrigation channels and ensuring 
input supply so that long-run cotton output remained roughly constant, whereas in Turkmenistan 
these functions were not performed well.4 The explanation most likely lies in the initial conditions: 
Tashkent was the center of Soviet Central Asia with greater administrative capacity (and the Ministry 
of Water Resources employed more people than any other ministry in the Uzbek Soviet Republic), but 
Turkmenistan lacked such a legacy of competent administration.
Turkmenistan was, however, saved from its economic mismanagement by rising energy prices just 
when the economy seemed to be in deep trouble at the end of the 1990s. Turkmenistan was the world’s 
fourth largest gas producer in 1991 with fairly modern facilities. Gas production was not much different 
in 2010, but soaring oil prices increased demand for gas and improved Turkmenistan’s bargaining position 
vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia’s Gazprom.
The two major Caspian oil producers, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, needed foreign expertise to 
exploit their oil and gas reserves. During the final decades of the Soviet Union, attention focused on 
Siberian oilfields to the neglect of Azerbaijan, which had been the major producing region in the early 
1900s. Kazakhstan was not a major oil producer in the Soviet era, but the biggest foreign investment 
contract in Soviet history happened to be on Kazakhstani territory: the Tengiz oilfield, in which Chevron 
was the lead producer. Tengiz came online in the 1990s, but the process was delayed by continual 
maneuvering by the Kazakh leadership to restructure the ownership in return for private payments. 
Azerbaijan’s oil sector was in a more parlous state, but in the dire economic and political conditions 
following the war with Armenia, the Azerbaijani leadership was desperate to have oil flowing as soon as 
possible. The Deal of the Century was signed in 1994 with a BP-led consortium of Western companies to 
develop a major offshore oilfield.
4. Virtually all crop land in Turkmenistan is irrigated. During the 1990s the budget for maintaining the Karakum Canal, 
the core of the irrigation system in southern Turkmenistan, fell from $3.2 million to $20,000 and the personnel employed 
in maintenance fell from 1,700 in 1987 to 640 in 1999; a consequence was increased salinization—a problem that had 
been avoided in irrigated agriculture in the area since prehistoric times (O'Hara and Hannan 1999). By 2001 the World 
Bank estimated that salinization affected 97 percent of the irrigated land in Turkmenistan.6
Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were thus placed to benefit from the post-1998 increase in world 
oil prices (figure 2). Whether the negotiating paths made a difference is disputed: Jones Luong and 
Weinthal (2010) argue that Azerbaijan’s approach of foreign ownership with domestic control of the oil 
sector is superior to Kazakhstan’s ceding control to foreign firms. This distinction is not so clear; BP had 
substantial independence of action in Azerbaijan in the 1990s, and in the 2000s Kazakhstan has shifted 
the ownership structure of its energy sector towards ever-greater involvement of the state energy company, 
KazMunaiGas (KMG). More important than this difference is the common feature that both countries 
signed contracts in time to benefit from the oil price increases in the first decade after 1998. Completion 
of new pipelines, the CPC pipeline to the Black Sea in 2001 and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to the 
Mediterranean in 2005, accentuated the benefits from the foreign investment of the 1990s. 
A more striking pair-wise contrast is between the Kyrgyz Republic and Mongolia. The Kyrgyz 
government quickly reached agreement with the Canadian company Cameco to develop the Kumtor 
goldmine. Despite allegations of corruption, concerns that the foreigners are taking the country’s 
resources, and environmental setbacks, the Kumtor mine began production and was providing about 
a sixth of Kyrgyz GDP in the early 2000s—a situation highlighted in 2002 when production suffered 
technical disruption and GDP growth dropped to zero. Mongolia by contrast prevaricated over the terms 
under which its resources would be exploited, discouraging major mining companies and, even when one 
of the world’s largest copper and gold deposits was confirmed at Oyu Tolgoi, exploitation was delayed by 
almost a decade due to negotiations over contracts and amendments to the mining and taxation laws.
The timing of exploitation matters. The Hartwick-Solow rule, that timing is unimportant and what 
matters is whether natural capital is transformed into physical or human capital, ignores changes in the 
relative price of the three forms of capital. In 1999–2008 the relative price of oil and gas and of copper 
and gold increased dramatically, and being able to take advantage of those favorable price trends gave 
resource-rich countries greater opportunity to create physical or human capital than if the resources had 
been sold in the 1990s or in 2009–10. Mongolia had no choice but to leave its copper and gold in the 
ground during the boom, because it had not created conditions for exploitation of its mineral resources. 
An even worse scenario could arise if country-specific resources become less valuable due to technical 
change (as, for example, happened to guano-exporting countries when superphosphate fertilizers were 
developed in Britain). Turkmenistan may face this scenario for its gas, if liquefied natural gas (LNG) or 
shale gas drive down prices and make new pipelines to Europe uneconomic. Mongolian coal may face a 
similar future if customers turn to cleaner energy sources, but at least coal does not depend on expensive 
pipelines.
In conclusion, if resources are not extracted, then there is no chance of a resource boom. If the delay 
is due to political bickering, which distracts policymakers’ attention from other matters, or rent-seeking 7
behavior, then it may contribute to a negative (i.e., resource curse) outcome. If the resources are extracted, 
then how it is done may make a difference. Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) laud the Uzbek/Turkmen 
approach of domestic ownership and control, but this can smother pressures for economic reform and 
become associated with stagnant output. Corrupt allocation of exploitation rights to favored partners 
may also have negative consequences, although the jury is still out on the long-run impact of institutional 
degradation in Kazakhstan in the 1990s when granting of exploration rights and reapportioning of 
shares in consortia were associated with massive corruption; for Tengiz, the lead operator was technically 
competent, but this is less clear for the troubled Kashagan offshore mega-field.5 Similarly in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the initial deal with Cameco, for all its shortcomings, was with a major producer, whereas 
the more convoluted negotiations in the 2000s over other goldfields have been with companies of lesser 
standing.6 The best outcomes are when a government keen to do business makes a deal with a good 
foreign partner, as Azerbaijan did with BP in the Deal of the Century. However, haste may lead to poor 
bargaining over distribution of the spoils, to which I will now turn.
shaRINg The ReNTs
Sharing the rents is typically the most controversial part of the process. Host governments are under-
standably concerned about the extent to which revenue from national resources accrues to foreigners. 
Preserving the rents for the host country can, however, lead to a resource curse when the government 
becomes addicted to the grasping hand (as in the treatment of cotton in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) 
or when internecine conflict among the elite challenges social cohesion (as in the Kyrgyz Republic). 
Mongolia’s mining laws and negotiations for development of Oyu Tolgoi were disastrously hampered by a 
fixation on a 51 percent shareholding. Kazakhstan’s resource nationalism in the 2000s involved increased 
shareholdings for the state-owned energy company KazMunaiGas (KMG) even when it contributed little, 
creating a poorer national environment for future foreign investment.
In practice, sharing the rents equitably is difficult. Foreign participation is necessary when only 
foreign firms have the required technical expertise, skilled labor, and financial resources to explore and 
exploit the resources. These firms need to recoup their costs and make a normal profit as well as self-insure 
for projects that prove barren. Moreover, there is a time inconsistency problem: The foreign firm becomes 
5. The Kashagan PSA was signed in 1997 with Eni as the lead operator. Repeated delays and cost increases have led some 
of the consortium partners to sell out, while Italian prime ministers Romano Prodi and Silvio Berlusconi have flown to 
Astana to negotiate terms for maintaining Eni's position (Nurmakov 2010, 29–32). Relations continued to deteriorate. 
In November 2010 Kazakhstan's financial police reported that Eni was under investigation for overrepresenting costs at 
Kashagan, which meant that the company had "avoided taxation and stolen state property" (reported in Financial Times 
(London), November 20, 2010). 
6. This may be changing as the license for exploration of the Aktash/Andash gold and copper deposits was granted in 2010 
to the Australian listed company Kentor Gold.8
more expendable once production is in train, so the foreign firm will insist on front-loading its share to 
reduce the costs of possible expropriation. Production sharing agreements (PSAs) are typically structured 
to reflect this time inconsistency. With asymmetric information and transfer pricing, however, the foreign 
firm may present the accounts so that cost recovery appears to take longer than in reality.7 If the state fails 
to specify environmental or work safety obligations or to hold the partner responsible for other negative 
externalities, then the partner will not be obligated to spend money on these. Because many energy or 
mining PSAs cover long-life projects, conditions will change, but the host may be tied to a contract under 
which changes can be challenged under arbitration that focuses on the narrow contractual arrangements 
without concern for social or other politically sensitive matters; ignoring an arbitration decision risks 
serious loss of future foreign investment.
Sharing the rents is controversial because changing the shares is perceived to be a zero-sum game, 
but there are long-term implications. The host nation should leave the foreign firm with a reasonable 
return on its physical and knowledge capital, recognizing that investment in natural resources is a risky 
business. If the government pushes too hard, as in Mongolia, there will be no resource exploitation. PSAs 
worked better in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan than in the Kyrgyz Republic because the size of the oil price 
increase after 1998 led to massive windfall gains to the host countries whether or not they had managed 
to maximize their share of the rents. Nevertheless, after about half a decade, the governments of both 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan tried to shift the shares in their favor by increasing the national oil companies’ 
participation, with some success but at the risk of discouraging future foreign investment.
If domestic companies are part of the exploiting consortium, then more revenues accrue 
domestically. The trade-off is that the domestic energy or mining companies often do not have anything 
to contribute to the consortium; absence of technology and skills is usually the principal reason for 
involving foreign companies. Moreover, state energy companies have often been highly politicized. 
The possibility that the rents may be siphoned off in the negotiating stage or through a nontransparent 
state entity or in Turkmenbashi’s case simply placed into off-budget accounts under presidential control 
highlights the potential for rent seeking rather than productive behavior, and hence institutional 
degradation.
The rent-sharing stage leads to a resource curse when governments and elites become addicted to 
grasping hand strategies, which lead to internecine conflicts among the elite. The former appeared to 
be a danger in Kazakhstan in the 1990s but seems to have been averted in the 2000s largely due to the 
7. In Pomfret (2011) I provide more details on the PSAs signed by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Disputes with Eni, lead 
operator of Kazakhstan's Kashagan oilfield, centered on whether the foreign company was overstating costs and hence 
postponing the date when revenues would flow into Kazakhstan's public purse.9
personality of the president. Internecine conflicts among the elite have been most apparent in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, but succession crises could be a catalyst in the autocratic countries.
UsINg ResOURCe ReveNUes
Once resources are being exploited governments face the question of how to use the revenues. Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan were able to generate large revenues during the 1998–2008 oil boom because they had 
involved foreign companies in exploration and exploitation of energy resources. As oil prices began to 
rise after 1998 and then soared after 2003, revenues far exceeded domestic absorption capacity, and 
both countries created sovereign wealth funds to manage the windfall.8 Both the State Oil Fund of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) and the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK) were 
established by presidential decree rather than by legislation that passed through parliament, thus leaving 
them subject to presidential discretion. For both countries a major issue has been making a credible 
commitment to avoid short-term plundering of the fund’s assets, especially as both countries had pressing 
reasons to increase social expenditures, as well as to invest domestically to promote future growth.
Kazakhstan appears to have been more successful in this respect, at least before the 2007 financial 
crisis, whereas Azerbaijan saved little of the windfall revenues (compare tables 5 and 6). Azerbaijan used 
its oil windfall to finance public expenditure, including poverty alleviation through water and irrigation 
projects, but it was doing so in an inefficient, and to some extent nontransparent, way. Between 2003 and 
2006 Azerbaijan’s government borrowed abroad an amount equal to about 4 percent of 2006 GDP, which 
made little financial sense when SOFAZ funds were being invested internationally to fetch 3 to 4 percent 
in nominal dollar terms, and ran a nonoil fiscal deficit equal to 30 percent of GDP (Usui 2007). By 
contrast Kazakhstan was paying off external debts to reduce future obligations. The situation changed in 
Kazakhstan in 2007 as the financial sector ran into serious problems; in 2008–09 substantial funds were 
transferred from the NFRK to help the ailing banking and construction sectors and provide stimulus for 
small and medium-sized enterprises and fund public investment.
In both countries it is early to assess how well the revenues are being used. Azerbaijan’s heavy current 
spending looks more risky, especially as its oil reserves have a relatively short projected life. Surges in 
social spending may be associated with diminishing returns and waste; Esanov (2009) finds diminishing 
efficiency of expenditures as spending on health, education, and social policy increased in resource-rich 
former Soviet republics. Kazakhstan has placed more emphasis on diversification of the economy and on 
human capital formation, but in the 2008–09 stimulus package withdrawals from the NFRK supported 
8. Kalyuzhnova and Kaser (2006) and Kalyuzhnova (2006, 2008) provide assessments of the oil funds of Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov (2009) argue that the Azeri and Kazakh oil funds are 
intended only to promote stability in order to ensure regime survival..10
delinquent banks and funded inefficient diversification. Walewski and Chubrik (2010), using household 
budget surveys, conclude that although poverty rates declined substantially in Azerbaijan between 2004 
and 2009 this was almost entirely due to direct impacts of the oil boom through the labor market and 
that redistribution by the government played no discernible role.9 Najman et al. (2008) report a similar 
lack of impact of state redistribution of oil revenues in Kazakhstan, although redistribution through the 
labor market helped to alleviate poverty.
Reliance on resource revenues rather than taxes reduces the need for governments to seek popular 
support for spending, fostering undemocratic systems and lack of checks on executive power. This is 
most clearly apparent in Turkmenistan where the country’s large cotton and gas rents were largely spent 
on prestige projects in support of a personality cult or disappeared into foreign bank accounts. Populist 
measures to provide free or low-cost basic needs were provided at the government’s pleasure, and residents 
had virtually no property rights (e.g., if the government chose to bulldoze their houses to make way for a 
new statue) or security of supply of power, heating, or plumbed water. In the absence of financial markets 
or real opportunity cost prices, the limited attempts at increasing productive capacity or diversification of 
the economy were grossly inefficient; textile mills and clothing factories to process Turkmen cotton had 
negative value-added at world prices (Pomfret 2006, 94–95).
Economic management has been better in Uzbekistan, but resource rent addiction fed an autocratic 
regime. This contributed to the disastrous decision to strengthen foreign exchange controls in 1996 and 
the difficulty that the government had in unraveling the system based on economic controls rather than 
on individual decisions taken in a market framework. Uzbekistan’s economy has enjoyed fairly steady 
growth but has fallen behind its neighbors, especially Kazakhstan in living standards and the Kyrgyz 
Republic in economic freedoms. The main shopping centers for Uzbeks are the massive markets in 
Bishkek (Dordoi) and near Osh (Kara-su), the two largest cities in the Kyrgyz Republic (Mitra, Kaminski, 
and Kholmatov 2009). Migration in search of work in Kazakhstan and Russia and semi-legal cross-border 
shopping in the Kyrgyz Republic have negative social and institutional consequences, whose ultimate 
causes are lackluster economic performance and lack of economic freedom.
In contrast to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where strong rulers have managed to ensure centralized 
control over rents, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic have had messier outcomes. In Tajikistan the first 
decade after independence was dominated by civil war. A major prize for the victor, who established 
the autocratic regime of the 21st century, is control over the revenues from the hydroelectric-aluminum 
complex, which accounts for the largest share of the country’s export earnings.
9. In an earlier study, Luecke and Trofimenko (2008) found some evidence of redistribution by the state, although they 
cautioned that this may have been no more than compensation to internally displaced people due to the conflict with 
Armenia.11
The Kyrgyz Republic had the least autocratic president in Central Asia, and he introduced the most 
liberal economic regime in the region. Nevertheless, corruption remained pervasive, including allegations 
against members of the presidential family and concerns over why the country appeared to benefit little 
from its gold exports. President Askar Akayev was overthrown in the peaceful 2005 tulip revolution, but 
hopes for a better functioning democracy were dashed when his successor turned out to be, if anything, 
more corrupt. President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was overthrown in April 2010. The country remains poor 
with ethnic divisions that erupted in June 2010 but also has the greatest freedom and least repressive 
government in Central Asia. Early signs as it attempts to establish a parliamentary democracy are that 
competition over resource rents has shifted from the presidential palace to parliament, and the challenge 
will be to forge a political system in which governments are held accountable for public spending.
An alternative to channeling resource rents into the state budget or sovereign wealth fund is to 
redistribute resource rents to the population, who can make private spending decisions, including voting 
on how much to devote to public expenditures through taxes. In Mongolia both major parties have 
promised cash handouts to the people, but doing this before earning substantial resource revenues looks 
like fiscal profligacy. In general, success in both attracting investment and managing resource rents in 
ways that produce a resource boon rather than a resource curse depends upon good governance and 
transparency.10
CONClUsIONs
Governments of resource-rich countries must decide how and how fast to exploit their natural resources, 
how to share the revenues between companies and the state, and how to use the state’s revenues. These are 
interconnected. If the “how” is unacceptable to any company with the technology to exploit the resource, 
then the other questions are irrelevant. If the terms are too attractive to a private-sector partner, then the 
country may achieve rapid exploitation but not have revenues to spend. Moreover, this is not a one-shot 
10. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) commitments can provide a signal of transparency, although EITI 
endorsement does not reduce corruption if the government makes no implementation effort. Őlcer (2009) found that 
in the six years after the launching of the EITI in 2002, countries endorsing EITI principles experienced deteriorating 
standards, as measured by World Bank Governance Indicators or Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index, and performed worse than the global average on these indicators. Azerbaijan joined the EITI in 2002, became 
a pilot country in July 2004, and in February 2009 was the first country to be validated as EITI compliant, which sent 
a positive signal about transparency and accountability. Mongolia committed to implement EITI in December 2005, 
and in October 2010 became the fourth country to be validated as EITI compliant. Both Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic made earlier commitments but have yet to obtain validation, although the Kyrgyz Republic in October 2010 
and Kazakhstan in December 2010 have been rated "close to compliant" (status from the EITI website, http://eiti.org 
[accessed 27 January 2011]). The EITI only relates to how revenues are collected. In April 2008 the World Bank proposed 
a new initiative (EITI++) focusing on the generation, management, and distribution of revenues, rather than just on the 
relationship between companies and governments as in the EITI.12
game: Either side may try to recontract, leaving the other to accept, renegotiate, or give up on the deal. 
In a bilateral monopoly situation, the government may win a battle over division of the spoils but deter 
future investors concerned about the credibility of government commitments.
Resources are not destiny. There are choices to be made that determine whether resources are 
a boon or a curse. Initial policy choices may lead to adverse institutional developments, but these 
institutions in turn may be changed. Failing to take advantage of resource abundance may be a missed 
opportunity, because the value of resources in the ground is constantly changing and what is valuable 
today may be obsolete in the future. Resource exploitation is, however, only the first step towards a 
resource boon. Failure to pursue good policies can often produce a resource curse, as the cross-country 
evidence shows. The formerly centrally planned economies may be especially prone to such an outcome 
due to their inexperience with policymaking in market-based economies and the absence of strong 
economic institutions, but the malleability of institutions can also be an advantage as adverse institutional 
consequences of initial decisions can be corrected.
None of the seven countries covered in this paper suffers yet from a full-blown irreversible resource 
curse, but the main potential source of a resource curse is institutional degradation. Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan all have autocratic regimes based on rent extraction rather than on wealth 
creation. This has been especially harmful for Turkmenistan because the country’s first president wasted 
much of the rents on personal aggrandizement. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan share some of these features, 
but the governments have attracted foreign investors and increased their countries’ productive capacity. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, resource abundance may have contributed to a culture of corruption and rent 
seeking among the elite, but in early 2011 the Kyrgyz Republic has the most open and democratic 
political and economic system in Central Asia, albeit with elements of instability.11
Earnings volatility has been less of a resource curse source, despite the massive surge in oil prices. 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan both created sovereign wealth funds in which windfall gains were deposited. 
Their differing approaches had costs and benefits: Azerbaijan saved less and the massive increase in current 
public-sector spending was associated with inefficiencies, while Kazakhstan saved more but ultimately 
had to use some of the savings to deal with private-sector inefficiencies. Yet, neither country has suffered 
permanent damage to the public finances, and the real sector has benefited from expenditures financed by 
11. The Kyrgyz outcome may be due to chance. Political developments in the closing years of the Soviet era led to discred-
iting of the Communist leadership, and Mikhail Gorbachev appointed a relative outsider to the post of first secretary of 
the Soviet republic. As elsewhere, the first secretary became president of the new independent state. President Akayev 
was more open to advice from Western economists and willing to adopt more liberal policies than his neighbors (e.g., 
the Kyrgyz Republic was the first Soviet successor state to join the World Trade Organization). Reforms did not have 
immediate positive outcomes and slowed down in the late 1990s, but the economy and media remained open.13
the funds. Volatility may have been more damaging to Uzbekistan, insofar as the government’s hasty and 
disastrous response to the downturn in cotton prices in 1996 blighted future economic policymaking.
In contrast to the varying experiences of the former southern Soviet republics, Mongolia had a 
major failure of public policy in not benefiting from its abundant mineral resources during the two 
decades after reforms began. The presence of minerals in the Gobi Desert was well-known even if precise 
locations were not, but a poor policy environment failed to encourage sufficient exploration—and 
without that there could be no exploitation. Consequently Mongolia missed out on the resource boom 
of the first decade of the 21st century. It was not a resource curse outcome but a missed opportunity. 
Mongolia could be looking forward to a resource boom in the 2010s.14
aPPeNDIx a COUNTRy exPeRIeNCes
In the early 1900s Azerbaijan produced half of the world’s oil, but output stagnated in the second half of 
the 20th century as Soviet oil investment focused on Siberia.12 After independence, war with Armenia in 
1992–93 over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh further disrupted production, which by 1994 
only just covered domestic demand.13 Military failure contributed to the overthrow of the Popular Front 
government and election of Heydar Aliyev as president in October 1993. Aliyev negotiated a ceasefire in 
May 1994 and moved to kick-start the economy by speedy increase in oil production.
Two state oil companies were merged to create the state energy company SOCAR, which has signed 
25 production sharing agreements (PSAs) with consortia of foreign oil companies, including the Deal of 
the Century. The deal was signed in September 1994 with a consortium of eight foreign oil companies 
led by BP, which committed to invest $7.4 billion in offshore oilfields over 30 years. Starting in 1997 oil 
production began to increase rapidly (table 4), with oil accounting for almost 90 percent of Azerbaijan’s 
exports by 2002. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to the Mediterranean was completed in 2005. 
SOCAR has a minority stake in all PSAs currently operational in Azerbaijan, including the 2003 PSA for 
the Caspian Sea’s largest gas field, Shah Deniz. A gas pipeline linking to the Turkish network at Erzurum 
was completed in 2006. 
The involvement of foreign companies was crucial in overcoming opposition to the development 
of Azerbaijan’s oil industry in the 1990s from Russia, which controlled the main pipelines, and from 
Iran, which disputed the demarcation of the South Caspian Sea. Coherence was given by the dominant 
position of BP, which took the lead in organizing the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline when oil prices began to rise. 
Azerbaijan was able to increase oil production faster than Kazakhstan in 1997–99, and oil now accounts 
for about half of GDP, but with more limited reserves Azerbaijan’s life as a major oil producer will be 
shorter than Kazakhstan’s.
In January 2003 SOCAR’s charter was revised so that the company retains ownership over oil it 
produces (previously it relinquished ownership once the oil went to be processed). SOCAR operates about 
40 older oilfields, which are generally high-cost due to depletion and aging equipment, and SOCAR’s 
payroll of 50,000 to 70,000 employees is considered bloated. However, with increasing output of oil and 
gas and increasing energy prices, SOCAR’s financial position strengthened after 2003—as did the assets 
12. This appendix draws on my paper presented in Panel XVII.16 Eurasia: Natural Resources and Economies at the VIII 
World Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES) in Stockholm on July 
26–31, 2010. For general background on the Central Asian economies, see Pomfret (1995, 2006).
13. The conflict began in 1988 when the majority-Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from 
the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the secession turned into open war between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, with Armenia not only gaining control over the disputed territory but also occupying about 9 
percent of undisputed Azerbaijan territory. A ceasefire was agreed in May 1994, but no peace treaty has been signed.15
of the State Oil Fund (table 5). The nature of SOCAR’s activities began to change around 2005 from 
resource-rent management to a more proactive role in knowledge transfer and geopolitics. Ilham Aliyev, 
who succeeded his father as president in 2003, appointed a younger cohort of senior officials and oversaw 
a closer integration of state company and government, including use of SOCAR to promote foreign 
policy goals. The rising importance of gas after the Shah Deniz PSA and the limited flexibility of gas 
delivery modes contributed to the shift, e.g., decisions to exclude Turkmen gas from Azerbaijan’s pipeline 
plans and to route pipelines through Georgia were politically driven. In 2007–08 SOCAR initiated 
international expansion, including acquisition and renovation of Georgia’s Kulevi oil terminal, offices in 
the United Kingdom, Romania, Switzerland, and Turkey, and plans to open 20 petrol stations in Georgia.
Oil revenues accrue to the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), which became operational in 
2001, as oil revenues rapidly increased (table 5). SOFAZ transfers a portion to the government budget and 
invests the remainder overseas to mitigate Dutch disease effects, but from the start disputes arose over the 
use of funds. In 2002 SOFAZ, contrary to its statutes, supported a commercial venture, the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline. There was also debate over the extent to which the fund should support social welfare 
spending; in 2003 the fund provided $24 million to finance resettlement and other assistance to people 
displaced by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and transferred $115 million to the state budget for other 
purposes. By 2006 expenditures from SOFAZ amounted to $357 million. Azerbaijan had by 2008 saved 
less than one-tenth of its oil windfall, in contrast to Russia and Kazakhstan, which both saved over half 
of their 2003–07 windfalls in oil funds (CASE 2008, 121). Meanwhile, from its revenues that are not 
transferred to the Oil Fund, SOCAR has been expected to make expenditures on hospitals, schools, and 
other social welfare areas, which are usually made by the state rather than an employer.
Kazakhstan has the Caspian Sea region’s largest recoverable crude oil reserves and accounts for over half 
of the oil currently produced in the region (table 4). The modern Caspian oil industry dates from the 
Tengiz agreement signed between Chevron and the Soviet Union in 1990—the largest foreign investment 
deal in Soviet history, which was inherited by Kazakhstan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
During the 1990s, exploitation of the Tengiz oilfield and exploration for other oilfields was hampered by 
lack of technical expertise, lengthy negotiations with potential foreign partners, and Russian control over 
pipeline routes. These obstacles had been more or less overcome by the early 2000s, coinciding with the 
start of the rapid rise in oil prices. Kazakhstan’s oil exports drove growth rates of over 9 percent per year in 
2000–07 and accounted for a third of the country’s GDP in 2005–07.
The 1990s in Kazakhstan were characterized by a series of deals between the president and the oil 
majors to revise the shareholdings in Tengiz and for the development of other large energy projects such as 
the Kashagan offshore oilfield and the Karachaganak gasfield. The process was extremely opaque, leading 
to drawn-out legal proceedings in New York and elsewhere (dubbed “Kazakhgate” by the media) and 16
imprisonment in the United States of a Mobil vice president for failing to declare a “commission” in his 
tax return (Pomfret 2005). Despite the corruption, PSAs succeeded in involving foreign companies and 
developing energy resources, but the process was slower and less transparent than in Azerbaijan.14 Foreign 
participation helped to ensure construction of new pipelines, which reduced dependence on the Russian 
pipeline company; the private CPC pipeline to the Black Sea opened in 2001 and the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline to the Mediterranean opened in 2005.
Since 1997 there has been concern in Kazakhstan that PSAs gave too much to foreign partners at 
the expense of Kazakhstan. When such concerns were explained by the inexperience of Kazakh lawyers 
in the early postindependence years, foreign investors feared that this was a prelude to rewriting contracts 
and protested strongly; in response President Nazarbayev guaranteed that no existing PSAs would be 
amended without consensus. In 1999, amendments to the Oil and Gas Law strengthened local content 
requirements, and subsequent PSAs specified local sourcing. There has been a growing tendency to 
favor domestic partners, and the 2005 PSA Law mandated a minimum 50 percent participation of 
KazMunaiGas (KMG).
KMG was created in 2002 by merging state corporations with a variety of oil and gas operations 
to form a 100 percent state-owned vertically integrated company. KMG’s operations include exploration 
and production, transportation, oil refining, petrochemicals, and marketing of oil and gas, as well as being 
the government’s negotiating arm in PSA contracts. The company is required to supply subsidized fuel to 
domestic markets and to provide some social services, reflecting its close connection to government and 
role in policy implementation. KMG’s role also includes increasing rent extraction for the government. In 
this aggressive intent KMG has some resemblance to Russian state-owned energy companies, Gazprom 
and Rosneft, although unlike the latter KMG has generally acquired larger shares of energy projects in 
a straightforward and transparent manner by purchase or the transfer of state-held licenses.15 By 2009 
KMG owned about 30 percent of oil production and 40 percent of proven reserves in Kazakhstan. Rather 
than being an instrument for crude resource nationalism, KMG is being promoted by the government 
as a national champion that will become a major international company in the mold of Statoil or China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).16
14. In contrast to Azerbaijan, whose main PSAs have been published, Kazakhstan's remain secret, although according to 
Muttitt (2007) the terms are known to all major oil producers.
15. However, the use of environmental regulations to push out PetroKazakhstan's Canadian owner was reminiscent of 
Russian policy in Sakhalin. The disposal of MMG had echoes of the Yukos affair (see below). Karachaganak is the only 
major energy project in which KMG does not have a share; a government threat to halt production if increased export 
duties are not paid (putting pressure on the existing partners to give a share to KMG) is under arbitration.
16. See Olcott (2007), Kennedy and Nurmakov (2010) and Domjan and Stone (2010). KMG's substantial investments in 
Georgia after 2006 were negatively affected by the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. KMG bought Romania's second largest oil 
company, Rompetrol, for $3.6 billion in 2007.17
In 2004 Kazakhstan began to revise the tax and other laws pertaining to PSAs.17 The government 
also began to demand a larger share for the national oil company, KMG, in energy projects. A flashpoint 
arose in 2007 when the development of the Kashagan megafield ran into technical difficulties, cost 
overruns, and revised projections of when oil exports would begin. In January 2008 the foreign 
participants (Eni, Shell, Total, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Inpex) agreed to reduce their shares in 
order to permit KMG, to increase its share to 16.8 percent. Meanwhile, in September 2007 Kazakhstan’s 
parliament passed a law giving the government power to renegotiate contracts deemed a threat to national 
security, although political leaders made clear that they were not intending to nationalize resources.
Kazakhstan has also increased pressure on Western participants in its energy sector by accepting 
Chinese participation. An early example was the case of PetroKazakhstan, a Canadian company that 
in the 1990s had developed the second-largest oil and gas output after Tengiz but that came into 
conflict with the government in 2005, including a fine for anticompetitive behavior and protests of its 
environmental and labor record. In August 2005 CNPC bought PetroKazakhstan for US$4.18 billion—
at the time the largest overseas acquisition by a Chinese company. In 2009, in return for providing nearly 
$13 billion in credits and loans to help Kazakhstan weather its financial crisis, China was allowed to 
increase its interests; CNPC bought the Kazakh oil producer MangistauMunaiGaz (MMG) in a joint 
deal with KMG worth $2.6 billion,18 and China Investment Corporation purchased 11 percent of the 
KMG Exploration and Production company for $939 million. The Chinese and Kazakh presidents, 
together with their Turkmen and Uzbek counterparts, opened a gas pipeline in December 2009, and an 
oil pipeline from western Kazakhstan to China is under construction. Agreements have also been reached 
with China on joint uranium production and a joint venture to develop a major copper project.
When prices exceed reference prices, extra revenues from oil, gas, copper, lead, zinc, and chrome are 
transferred to the National Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK), which was established in 2000. 
The NFRK must keep at least a fifth of its assets in the stabilization portfolio, which has specific criteria 
requiring investment in liquid foreign financial instruments. During the 2003–07 boom, when oil prices 
rose far above the reference price of $19, Kazakhstan showed prudence in depositing most of the windfall 
in the NFRK.
17. Legislation tightened the definition of which development costs are covered by PSAs. The government introduced a 
rent tax on oil exports in 2004 and increased royalty payments on oil and gas in 2005. In 2009 royalties were replaced by a 
natural resources extraction tax as part of a major tax reform aimed at easing the burden on small and medium-sized enter-
prises and on the nonextractive sector while increasing revenues from extractive industries.
18. The MMG case was complicated by the involvement in MMG of the president's son-in-law, who was under inves-
tigation for criminal activities. Domjan and Stone (2010) liken the case to that of Yukos in Russia, where a previously 
powerful oligarch was displaced after falling out of political favor, but the MMG takeover was conducted by a more 
accepted legal process and did not result in a simple state takeover.18
The private sector showed no such prudence. The high growth was associated with foreign 
borrowing based on a strong country credit rating. Banks borrowed abroad and lent domestically, fueling 
a real estate bubble. Foreign debt, which had been zero at independence, amounted to over  
90 percent of GDP by 2008 and Kazakhstan faced a home-grown financial crisis as domestic loans turned 
bad; repayments to foreign creditors of around $14 billion due in 2008 coincided with the collapse of 
world oil prices. In late 2008 the government launched an anticrisis plan, pledging $10 billion or  
9.5 percent of GDP, largely from the NFRK. The plan focused on capital injections into four major banks 
(made through Samruk-Kazyna, the government holding company for state-owned assets), support for 
construction and the real estate market, assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises and agriculture, 
and public investment in industry. After a February 2009 devaluation of the tenge by 20 percent, 
Kazakhstan’s debt/GDP ratio exceeded 100 percent.
Esanov and Kuralbayeva (2010) refer to this combination of public prudence and private profligacy 
as the Ricardian curse of the oil boom. The public prudence meant that Kazakhstan was able to weather 
a serious domestic financial crisis by calling on the liquid assets held by the NFRK. However, holding 
liquid foreign assets that would be used to bail out banks that had overcommitted in the housing bubble 
was surely not the best use of resources from a national perspective. The government did attempt to use 
the windfall revenues to diversify agriculture, promote clusters of manufacturing activity, and invest in 
human capital, but given the country’s endowment it could have used oil revenues to an even greater 
extent to promote future productive capacity rather than supporting construction in the main cities.
The unrestrained private sector boom and bust is also having implications for the structure of 
ownership in the Kazakhstan economy. KMG is becoming an increasingly important player in the energy 
sector but the larger issue is the role of Samruk-Kazyna, the National Welfare Fund.The state is the 
sole shareholder of Samruk-Kazyna, which was created in October 2008 with the merger of two funds, 
Samruk and Kazyna. Samruk-Kazyna owns, either in whole or in part, over 400 companies, including 
KMG, the state uranium company, Air Astana, the national rail and postal service, and numerous 
financial groups; according to International Monetary Fund (IMF 2009) estimates, it accounted for 
46 percent of GDP. Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard (2011) argue that Samruk-Kazyna’s role as a vehicle for 
state policy has increased in 2009–10 following the perceived failure of the banking sector to allocate 
resources in line with national priorities. Despite public commitments to save a larger share of future 
oil revenues in the NFRK, relations between NFRK and Samruk-Kazyna will be crucial in determining 
leakages from the Oil Fund into the domestic economy and how those funds are used.19
19. The IMF’s 2010 staff report (IMF Country Report 10/241, July 2010, 14) reported the government’s commitment 
to rebuild the NFRK by saving a higher proportion of oil revenues over the next decade and setting a ceiling on annual 
transfers from the NFRK to the state budget with the target of reducing the nonoil budget deficit from 11 percent of GDP 
in 2009 to 3 percent by 2020.19
Turkmenistan, the other major energy producer, was less eager to negotiate contracts with foreign energy 
companies. At independence the resource base was cotton and a recently developed natural gas sector, 
neither of which was in urgent need of foreign expertise. President Niyazov (or Turkmenbashi the Great 
as he preferred to be known) used resource rents to fund populist polices and grandiose buildings. Cotton 
provided the revenues in the mid-1990s, but the government offered little incentive to farmers and 
production was falling. As rents from cotton exports declined, revenues from gas exports began to increase 
after 2000, largely due to external price changes; the volume of gas produced was lower in the 2000s than 
it had been in 1990 (table 4).
Gas exports went to or through Russia to markets in the former Soviet Union, primarily Ukraine 
and Azerbaijan. Payment was partly by barter and bills were often not paid, to the extent that in 
1997–99 Turkmenistan resorted to the extreme step of cutting off supplies to Ukraine (reflected in 
gas output, table 4, and in the fall in GDP in 1997, table 3). As energy prices increased after 1998, 
Turkmenistan’s bargaining position strengthened and the payment terms gradually improved after 
2003 (Pomfret, forthcoming). In Turkmenbashi’s final year, 2006, and under his successor, Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov, there were signs that the government was concerned about increasing gas output and 
negotiating a better price. A deal with China included construction of a gas pipeline through Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan to western China, which was completed in 2009, breaking Russia’s quasi-monopoly.20 
In sum, Turkmenistan has been successful in recent years in increasing and diversifying its gas exports; 
exports to China will be 4.5 to 5.0 bcm in 2010, reaching 40 bcm by 2013 and gas exports to Iran will 
increase from 8 bcm to 20 bcm. Although Turkmenistan was vulnerable to disruption of exports to Russia 
between April and December 2009, this dependence will be less problematic in future.
At independence oil output was small, but onshore and offshore reserves in western Turkmenistan 
were believed to be substantial. Large Western firms were encouraged by PSAs in the 1990s, but after 
the turn of the century initial involvement of ExxonMobil and Monument was changed in favor of 
smaller companies such as Burren Energy, Dragon Oil, and Petronas.21 Mobil and Monument cut their 
activities by half in the late 1990s due to high costs of extraction and transportation and dissatisfaction 
with the tax regime. In mid-2000 Burren took over the interests of Monument, and ExxonMobil pulled 
out of Turkmenistan in 2002. In other oilfields, small foreign companies (e.g., Pado Oil and Chemical 
of Austria) became nonoperating partners in joint ventures with the national company TurkmenNeft. 
Schlumberger, the only foreign service company operating at oilfields in western Turkmenistan, serviced 
20. For gas exports there was no practical alternative to pipelines and, apart from a small pipeline to Iran completed in 
1997, all pipelines ran north to Russia. A second pipeline to Iran opened in 2010.
21. Investor confidence was not helped by contractual disputes with Bridas over a transAfghanistan pipeline. The 
Argentinean company's contract was terminated in favor of one with Unocal, but US support terminated in 2007 when 
relations with the Taliban government deteriorated.20
the wells and provided necessary equipment under a five-year contract, signed in February 1998, but 
Schlumberger’s work was hindered by government interference and TurkmenNeft failed to pay the 
company on time. The target of raising oil production to 10 million tons by 2000 was not reached; the 
output of just over 7 million tons in 2000 was not much higher than in 1985 and less than the 1975 peak.
In 2003 Turkmenbashi signaled an intention to sign a PSA with a consortium of Russian companies 
to exploit offshore oil and gas fields but did not finalize the deal. By the mid-2000s it was becoming 
clear that to increase oil and gas output Turkmenistan needed foreign capital and know-how.22 The 
energy majors responded by showing renewed interest in Turkmenistan. Eni purchased Burren Energy 
in 2007, but this may have been primarily to acquire Burren’s African interests.23 Despite strong 
lobbying by Western majors, contracts worth $9.7 billion to develop the South Yolotan gasfield were 
awarded in December 2009 to firms from China (CNPC), South Korea (LG International and Hyundai 
Engineering) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE Gulf and Oil Gas) and Petrofac, with financing from 
China’s State Development Bank. Although Russia and Turkmenistan remained mired in a price dispute 
for most of 2009, President Berdymukhamedov seemed unwilling to antagonize Russia by bringing in 
Western energy firms. 
In sum, whatever the signals since Turkmenbashi’s death in December 2006, Turkmenistan has not 
yet created a positive environment for foreign investors in oil and gas. Relations with foreign companies 
remain politicized and centralized, with potential investors having to pay “gatekeepers” for access to the 
president. The pervasive corruption, reflected in the country’s abysmal rankings in the Transparency 
International corruption perceptions index, has been itemized in the Wikileaks US diplomatic cables. 
The US embassy reported that the “access fee” to meet the president had risen by 10 to 15 percent since 
Berdymukhamedov came to power. The most ostentatious act occurred in autumn 2008, when Itera 
presented President Berdymukhamedov with a gift of a 60-million-euro luxury yacht, after a consortium 
including Itera had signed a PSA and shortly before Itera won a $250 million contract to build a five-star 
hotel in Avaza.24
22. Kalyuzhnova (2008, 83–86) emphasizes lack of technical skills after the departure of Soviet specialists as the cause of 
falling revenues per cubic meter of gas exports (e.g., due to poorly maintained pipelines). She also highlights how much 
time in exploring offshore oil reserves (as of 2007) had been wasted due to lack of technical expertise. 
23. The Turkmen government was annoyed that it had not been involved in the negotiations and in 2008 refused to 
issue visas to Eni personnel. The bad blood reportedly also reflected information-sharing between Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, with Kazakhstan expressing disappointment with Eni's performance as lead operator of Kashagan.
24. Itera originated as a US-registered company (International Trading Energy and Resources Association), whose founder 
and main shareholder, Igor Makarov, was a Turkmenistan citizen with good connections in Ukraine and Turkmenistan. In 
2000 Itera held the contract for selling Turkmenistan gas; despite owning the pipeline, Gazprom allowed Itera to handle 
the sales and bought about a third of Turkmenistan's exports from Itera at a much higher price, $45 per 1,000 m3, than 
Itera paid Turkmenistan ($35.37 per 1,000 m3). By 2001 the main holding company of Itera was registered in the Dutch 
Antilles and over 60 percent of the shares were held in trust for unnamed individuals, one of whom turned out to be a 21
Uzbekistan has also been reluctant to involve foreign firms in its resource sectors. Given that it has 
the largest population and second largest GDP of the countries covered in this paper, the foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows have been modest (table 2). Kalotay (2010, 63) reports that FDI into 
Uzbekistan between 1992 and 2009 accounted for less than 5 percent of gross fixed capital formation, the 
lowest of any of the Eastern European and former Soviet Union transition economies.
The Uzbekistan economy is better managed than that of Turkmenistan, and buoyed by rising world 
cotton prices in 1992–96 Uzbekistan had the shallowest transitional recession of any former Soviet 
republic. Cotton remains a major export. Uzbekistan’s second largest export is gold, in the production of 
which foreign partners have played a role, but the arrangements and gold output are not publicized by 
the government. Although Uzbekistan is a large producer of natural gas and minor producer of oil, this 
meets domestic demand and Uzbekistan is roughly self-sufficient in energy. The economy has continued 
to grow, but the rate of growth since the late 1990s has lagged that of other Central Asian countries.
Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet republics. Independence was accompanied by a civil war, 
which was not settled until 1997, and the government’s hold over parts of the country remains tenuous. 
Tajikistan was a major cotton producer in the Soviet era, but the sector has declined since independence. 
The country also has substantial hydroelectric potential, which has yet to be realized, despite recurrent 
reports of Russian FDI. The main use of existing hydro-power is in a Soviet-era aluminum smelter, which 
is by far the country’s largest industrial facility. Although many of the country’s resource-related issues are 
similar to those covered here, Tajikistan does not feature much in this paper because its main challenge 
continues to be the construction of a functioning state and post-Soviet economy.
The Kyrgyz Republic shares some of Tajikistan’s characteristics—a poor mountainous country whose 
hydroelectricity development is stymied by opposition from downstream neighbors—but it has been 
more successful in nation-building. The Kyrgyz economy is the most liberal in Central Asia, although 
it does not function as well as a market economy should because institutional development is flawed 
and corruption remains a major feature. Uniquely in Central Asia, two presidents have been replaced by 
popular uprisings and in 2010 a constitution limiting presidential power and promising a parliamentary 
democracy was adopted. Kumtor, the eighth largest goldmine in the world, accounted for about a sixth 
former deputy prime minister of Turkmenistan and others were believed to include high-ranking Gazprom managers. 
After Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia and the Gazprom senior management was revamped in 2001–02, Itera lost 
the contract. In February 2004, Makarov and the governor of Saint Petersburg, led a high-level delegation to Turkmenistan 
and signed a PSA for the Zarit consortium (in which Rosneft and Itera each held 37 percent shares) to develop an offshore 
oil and gas field. The PSA was not finalized due to concerns over territorial disputes with Iran, but in March 2007 Zarit 
met with President Berdymukhamedov to discuss offshore oil and gas development, and in April 2008 Zarit signed PSAs 
to develop three offshore blocks.22
of the Kyrgyz Republic’s GDP in the early 2000s and dominated the country’s exports; when the mine’s 
production was disrupted in 2002, GDP growth dropped to zero.
Kumtor was considered commercially nonviable by Soviet geologists, but in 1992 a Canadian 
company, Cameco, offered to take managerial control of the mine, which would be structured as a joint 
venture, two-thirds owned by the Kyrgyz government and one-third by Cameco. The arrangement was 
a PSA with initial revenues accruing to Cameco until it had recouped its upfront costs, but negotiation 
details were nontransparent. The mine started operation in 1997 and by the end of 2006 had produced 
more than 5.8 million ounces of gold. The mine was controversial, in part because despite its substantial 
contribution to GDP it appeared to contribute little to public revenues. Protests about environmental 
damage (e.g., an incident in 1998 when a truck carrying 1,762 kilograms of sodium cyanide fell into a 
river on the way to Kumtor) and mine safety (e.g., a 2002 death when part of the mine collapsed) were 
inflamed in 2005 when it turned out that compensation paid by the company to people suffering from 
the 1998 incident had ended up in the pocket of a senior official (Ababakirov 2008).
In 2004 Cameco and the state gold agency restructured the joint venture as Centerra Gold. The 
Kyrgyz share was reduced from 66 to 30 percent in return for larger payments into the state budget. 
The government subsequently sold half of its share to raise money for public expenditure on social 
projects. Concerns about the actual destination of these revenues contributed to the public unrest, which 
culminated in the overthrow of President Akayev in March 2005. The new government renegotiated the 
arrangement, reaching an agreement in November 2006 that increased the Kyrgyz state’s share from 16 
to 29 percent, but the Kyrgyz parliament refused to ratify the agreement. After December 2007 elections 
President Bakiyev sought a more than 30 percent stake in the gold production, and throughout 2008 the 
Kyrgyz authorities made efforts to compel Centerra to sign a new agreement, e.g., in June 2008 a district 
court in Bishkek voided Centerra’s exploration license and the government used the court ruling as a 
pretext to suspend the company’s bank accounts and other liquid assets. The Supreme Court reinstated 
the license after Centerra threatened to take the matters to the International Court of Arbitration. Finally, 
the joint venture agreement was revised in April 2009; the Kyrgyz state’s share in Kumtor was increased 
from 15 to 33 percent, tax will be levied at a 14 percent flat rate instead of six separate duties, which 
included withholding taxes of up to 30 percent, and the company had to pay $22.4 million in back taxes.
The Kyrgyz Republic’s second-biggest goldmine project, Jerooy, was abandoned in the 2000s by 
Oxus, a British company frustrated by continuous corruption and intimidation. Two weeks after Oxus 
representative Sean Daley was shot at his home in Bishkek in 2006, the government announced that the 
license had been transferred from Oxus to an Austrian-based company called Global Gold, believed to 
be in cahoots with the president’s son. Residual claims by Oxus were settled in 2007, but in 2006–08 the 
country lost an estimated $88 million to $98 million per year in forgone revenues (International Crisis 23
Group 2008, 11). In November 2009 the Kyrgyz Republic Development Fund announced that Jerooy 
was up for sale; a feasibility study had been concluded, but no gold had been produced.
Mongolia was an independent country before 1991 but so closely integrated into the Soviet economy 
that it was referred to as the sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union. Political transition was relatively easy, 
and Mongolia has a democratic political system with rotation of power following elections. Economic 
transition was much harder, as termination of Soviet assistance to Mongolia in 1990–92 contributed to 
what may have been the largest peacetime decline in gross national expenditure anywhere. Mongolia has 
established a market-based economic system, although as in the Kyrgyz Republic this has not brought the 
anticipated level of prosperity.
Mongolia’s largest enterprise, the Erdenet copper and molybdenum complex in the mid-north, 
was established with Soviet aid in 1978 and expanded in several stages, the last in 1987. Thus, Mongolia 
had a reasonably modern facility at the end of the Soviet era, but since independence that complex has 
been in decline.25 Domestic coal production met most of the energy requirements of the main towns and 
industrial and mining sites. Gold was also produced in many small-scale operations. The Mardai mine, 
which operated under a 1981 concession to produce uranium for Soviet nuclear warheads, was staffed by 
Russians and was so secret that it did not appear on maps. In 1990–92 many Soviet technicians departed.
Although Mongolia was believed to contain unexploited mineral resources, little exploration took 
place during the 1990s. Democracy in Mongolia has been associated with alternation of governments 
and large swings in economic policy from freewheeling but corrupt capitalism to a more dirigiste 
approach, neither of which encouraged the long-term capital inflows necessary to fund copper or coal 
mines. Development of the Mardai uranium mine by a Canadian-Russian joint venture was dogged by 
mutual recriminations as the Canadians complained about government delays in issuing a mining lease 
and an arbitrary windfall profits tax, Russian workers complained about delayed pay and the Russian 
partner complained that Mongolian workers stripped the town’s assets; the Canadian partner pulled out 
in 1998 after investing $6 million. During the commodity boom of the 2000s, Mongolia passed laws 
placing punitive taxes on foreign companies.26 The aim was to ensure that the state gained a large share of 
Mongolia’s mineral wealth, but the effect was to deter investors.
25. Erdenet had produced a million tons of copper concentrate by 1989. Dorian (1991, 46) reported that it was the largest 
copper mine in Asia at that time.
26. In 2008 the World Bank estimated an effective tax rate (the present value of all taxes, fees, and other imposts paid 
by a mine to the state) of over 60 percent, higher than any other country except Burkina Faso and about equal to that 
in Uzbekistan and Côte d'Ivoire (World Bank, The Mongolia Minerals Sector—Key Issues, unpublished paper). The Fraser 
Institute ranked Mongolia 50th out of 51 jurisdictions (behind Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, Venezuela, 
Bolivia, etc.—only Ecuador was worse) in policy attractiveness for mining companies (Survey of Mining Companies 
2009/2010: 2010 Mid-Year Update, Vancouver, August 2010, available at www.fraserinstitute.org).24
Mongolia’s first major new mining project should be the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine located 
in the Gobi desert, near the Chinese border, and estimated to hold 45 million ounces of gold and  
79 billion pounds of copper (nearly 3 percent of the world’s total supply). The mine was discovered by 
Canadian company Ivanhoe in 2001. Negotiations between the Mongolian government and Ivanhoe 
stretch back to 2003, but something always prevented an investment deal from being signed, notably laws 
passed by the government to capitalize on high metal prices. In September 2009, Mongolia’s parliament 
revoked four 2006 mining laws, including a windfall profits tax, which exacted a 68 percent tax on  
copper sold above $2,600 per ton and gold sold above $500 per ounce (in 2009 copper traded around 
$6,470 per ton and gold around $960 per ounce) and a law giving the government a 34 percent stake in 
mines explored without government funding and a 50 percent share in projects with such funding; under 
the parliament’s new deal, the windfall tax was thrown out, and the government gets a flat 34 percent 
stake in Oyu Tolgoi and other mines.
In October 2009 Ivanhoe and its partner Rio Tinto signed an investment agreement with the 
Mongolian government committing $6 billion investment in Oyu Tolgoi to begin full-scale construction 
in 2010 and production in 2013. Settlement of the disputes surrounding Oyu Tolgoi sent a crucial signal 
to investors interested in Mongolia’s rich coal, uranium, and other mineral deposits. China Investment 
Corporation took a $500 million stake in South Gobi Energy, a company with coal assets in Mongolia, 
and announced a $700 million investment in Iron Mining International, a company with interests in 
Mongolia. Australian company, Leighton Holdings, which had earlier in 2009 won the contract for the 
Ukhaa Khudag coal mine in the South Gobi region, announced additional investment of A$195 million 
to increase the contract’s value to A$480 million.
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Table 1     Demographic data, output, and income, 1991 and 2007
Indicator azerbaijan Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz 
Republic Mongolia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
1991
Population (millions) 7.3 16.5 4.5 2.2 5.4 3.8 21
GDP (billions of  
US dollars)
8.8 24.9 2.6 2 2.5 3.2 13.8
GNI per capita (PPP in 
international dollars)
2,100** 4,680 1,690 1,987 2,080 2,200** 1,290*
Life expectancy (years) 65 68 69 61 63 63 69
Adult literacy (percent) 97 98 97 98 97 98 97
2007
Population (millions) 8.6 15.5 5.2 2.6 6.7 5 26.9
GDP (billions of  
US dollars)
33 104.9 3.8 3.9 3.7 9.5 22.3
GNI per capita (PPP in 
international dollars)
6,630 9,520 1,980 3,160 1,710 5,510 2,430
Trade/GDP (percent) 97 92 133 130 87 153 71
* = 1992; ** = 1993
GNI = gross national income; PPP = purchasing power parity
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, www.worldbank.org.
Table 2     Inward foreign direct investment, 1992–2009 (millions of US dollars)
year azerbaijan Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz 
Republic Mongolia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
1992 0 100 n.a. 2 9 n.a. 9
1993 0 1,271 10 8 9 79 48
1994 22 660 38 7 12 103 73
1995 155 964 96 10 10 233 –24
1996 591 1,137 47 16 18 108 90
1997 1,051 1,322 83 25 18 108 167
1998 948 1,161 109 19 30 62 140
1999 355 1,438 44 30 7 125 121
2000 130 1,284 –2 54 24 131 75
2001 227 2,836 5 43 9 170 83
2002 1,392 2,593 5 78 36 276 65
2003 3,285 2,082 46 132 32 226 83
2004 3,556 4,131 132 93 272 354 177
2005 1,680 1,982 43 185 54 418 192
2006 –584 6,360 182 191 339 731 174
2007 –4,749 11,096 208 360 360 804 705
2008 14 15,775 265 683 376 820 711
2009 473 12,649 60 437 8 1,355 750
Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development data,  http://unctadstat.unctad.org (accessed on January 17, 2011).28
Table 3     growth in real gDP, 1990–2010 (percent)
year azerbaijan Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz 
Republic Mongolia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
1990 0 3 –3 –2 2 2
1991 –1 –13 –5 –9 –7 –5 –1
1992 –23 –3 –19 –10 –29 –5 –11
1993 –23 –9 –16 –3 –11 –10 –2
1994 –20 –13 –20 2 –19 –17 –4
1995 –12 –8 –5 6 –13 –7 –1
1996 1 1 7 2 –4 –7 2
1997 6 2 10 4 2 –11 3
1998 10 –2 2 4 5 5 4
1999 10 2 4 3 4 16 4
1999 (1989 = 100) 45 63 63 44 64 94
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report Update, April 2001, 15.
1998 10 –2 2 4 5 7 4
1999 11 3 4 3 4 17 4
2000 11 10 5 1 8 19 4
2001 10 14 5 1 10 20 4
2002 11 10 0 4 9 16 4
2003 11 9 7 6 10 17 4
2004 10 9 7 10 11 17 8
2005 24 10 0 7 7 10 7
2006 31 11 3 9 7 11 7
2007 23 9 8 10 8 12 10
2008 11 3 8 9 8 11 9
2009 9 1 2 –2 3 6 8
2010 9 6 –4 7 6 11 8
Note: Data for 2010 are preliminary actual figures from official government sources.
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Macroeconomic Indicators, www.ebrd.com (accessed on January 16, 2011).29
Table 4    Production of crude oil and natural gas, azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and  
  Uzbekistan, 1985–2009
year
Oil (million tons) gas (billions of cubic meters)
azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
1985 13.2 22.7 6.8 2.3 12.7 4.9 75.3 31.3
1986 13.1 23.3 6.6 2.5 12.3 5.2 76.7 34.9
1987 13.9 24.1 6.5 2.7 11.3 5.7 79.7 36
1988 13.7 25 5.7 2.4 10.8 6.4 79.9 36.1
1989 13.2 25.4 5.8 2.7 10 6.1 81.4 37.2
1990 12.5 25.8 5.7 2.8 9 6.4 79.5 36.9
1991 11.8 26.6 5.4 2.8 7.8 7.1 76.3 37.9
1992 11.2 25.8 5.2 3.3 7.1 7.3 54.4 38.7
1993 10.3 23 4.4 4 6.2 6.1 59.1 40.8
1994 9.6 20.3 4.2 5.5 5.8 4.1 32.3 42.7
1995 9.2 20.6 4.1 7.6 6 5.3 29.2 43.9
1996 9.1 23 4.4 7.6 5.7 5.9 31.9 44.3
1997 9 25.8 5.4 7.9 5.4 7.3 15.7 46.4
1998 11.4 25.9 6.4 8.2 5.1 7.2 12 49.6
1999 13.9 30.1 7.1 8.1 5.4 9 20.6 50.3
2000 14.1 35.3 7.2 7.5 5.1 10.4 42.5 51.1
2001 15 40.1 8 7.2 5 10.5 46.4 52
2002 15.4 48.2 9 7.2 4.7 10.2 48.4 51.9
2003 15.5 52.4 10 7.1 4.6 12.6 53.5 52
2004 15.6 60.6 9.6 6.6 4.5 20 52.8 54.2
2005 22.4 62.6 9.5 5.4 5.2 22.6 57 54
2006 32.5 66.1 9.2 5.4 6.1 23.9 60.4 54.5
2007 42.8 68.4 9.8 4.9 9.8 26.8 65.4 59.1
2008 44.7 72 10.2 4.8 14.8 29.8 66.1 62.2
2009 50.6 78 10.2 4.5 14.8 32.2 36.4 64.4
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, www.bp.com (accessed on January 16, 2011).30
Table 5    state Oil fund of azerbaijan, financial data,  
  2001–10 (millions of AZN)
year
assets  
(as of January 1) Revenue expenditure
2001 248 225 3
2002 470 295 87
2003 678 364 237
2004 805 317 171
2005 950 660 330
2006 1,280 986 999
2007 1,267 1,886 1,061
2008 2,092 11,865 4,970
2009 8,987 8,177 5,295
2010 11,869
Total, 2001–10 24,774 13,154
AZN = Azerbaijani manat
Notes: All figures are in new manats (i.e., 2001-04 data are adjusted for the redenomina-
tion of the currency); on January 1, 2010, AZN 1 = 0.87 euros  = US$ 1.24.
Source: Walewski and Chubrik (2010), based on State Oil Fund accounts at http://www.
oilfund.az/en/account.
Table 6    National fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan,  
  financial data, 2001–09 (millions of US dollars)
year
assets  
(as of January 1) Revenue expenditure
2001 1,345 51
2002 1,293 715 1
2003 2,007 1,539 3
2004 3,543 1,024 4
2005 4,564 3,113 5
2006 7,672 6,145 7
2007 13,810 9,300 2,117
2008 20,993 13,737 8,937
2009 25,793
Total, 2001–08 36,918 11,125
Source: Esanov and Kuralbayeva (2010, 21), based on Ministry of Finance data.31
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